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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
INTRODUCTION
The subject of criminal procedure is as broad as it is significant. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit published over 150
decisions during this survey period' implicating concepts under the
criminal procedure umbrella. This survey addresses decisions focusing
on two of those concepts: procedural safeguards mandated by the United
States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona,2 and the fundamental right
to counsel accorded to defendant's through the Sixth Amendment
In Miranda, the Supreme Court laid out the important elements of
what would later be called the Miranda warnings: the substance of those
warnings, a temporal limitation defining when authorities must give the
warnings,' and requirements for how police may obtain a waiver from the
suspect. Parts I and II of this survey focus on the timing and waiver as-
pects of Miranda-the more contentious issues raised by the decision
and subsequent applications. Part I discusses the requirement that the
Miranda warning precede custodial interrogation and reviews two Tenth
Circuit cases examining at what point contact between the police and a
suspect rises to this level.6 Part II focuses on a suspect's waiver of his
Miranda rights, analyzing two cases in which the defendant challenged
the validity of the Miranda waiver.7
Part III begins with an examination of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, including the distinction between that and the Fifth Amend-
ment's right to counsel provision under Miranda. The survey then fo-
1. This survey addresses cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit between September 1, 1997, and August 31, 1998.
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the Court held that under the Fifth
Amendment, the prosecution could not use a defendant's confession or self-incriminating statement
obtained during a custodial interrogation unless certain procedural safeguards were present. See
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Before questioning commenced, the person was to be warned of the "right
to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This survey will also highlight the distinction between the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel-which is mandated by the Constitution-and the Fifth Amendment
right to counsel as expanded by Miranda. See discussion infra Part 11I.
4. A Miranda warning is required prior to a custodial interrogation. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at
444.
5. A waiver must be made "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Id.
6. See United States v. Torres-Guevara, 147 F.3d 1261, 1266 (10th Cir. 1998); United States
v. Benally, 146 F.3d 1232, 1238-39 (10th Cir. 1998).
7. See United States v. Gell-Iren, 146 F.3d 827, 830 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Bauti-
sta, 145 F.3d 1140, 1146-50 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 255 (1998).
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cuses on two Tenth Circuit decisions which address potential violations
of the Sixth Amendment!
I. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION-THE TEMPORAL ASPECT OF MIRANDA
A. Background
The Supreme Court's decision in Miranda was an attempt to find
balance between societal interest in prosecuting criminal activity and
constitutional protections provided to the accused? The Court reviewed
police interrogation methods and found the methods were intended "to
put the defendant in such an emotional state as to impair his capacity for
rational judgment."'" The Court stated that these procedures were used to
"persuade, trick, or cajole [the suspect] out of exercising his constitu-
tional rights."" Although Miranda has since spawned over thirty years of
debate, 2 the Court viewed its holding "not [as] an innovation in our ju-
8. See Strachan v. Army Clemency & Parole Bd., 151 F.3d 1308, 1311 (10th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Lin Lyn Trading Ltd., 149 F.3d 1112, 1117 (10th Cir. 1998).
9. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439; see also Mark A. Godsey, When Terry Met Miranda: Two
Constitutional Doctrines Collide, 63 FORDHAm L. REV. 715, 717, 725 (1994) (asserting that the
Supreme Court intended that Miranda would redress the inherently coercive nature of interrogations,
therefore creating an environment in which the suspect may invoke his constitutional rights.) A
Terry stop, however, enables an officer to stop and frisk a suspect for weapons upon reasonable
suspicion, rather than probable cause when the officer "has reason to believe that he is dealing with
an armed and dangerous individual." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
10. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465. Training methods stressed the use of psychological factors
during interrogations. See id. at 448. For example, training advised that interrogations should take
place in a setting unfamiliar to the suspect. See id. at 449-50. Questioners were to act confidently
that the suspect committed the crime and direct comments as to why----and not whether--the suspect
was involved. See id. at 450. The questioner was to blame the victim or society, and de-emphasize
the "moral seriousness" of the crime. Id. If such "kindness and stratagems" did not work, the ques-
tioner was to rely on an "oppressive atmosphere of dogged persistence." Id. at 451. Training stressed
that interrogation should be "steadily and without relent" for several hours. Id. In the most serious
cases, interrogation was to last for days--with only the required breaks for food and sleep-while
the police maintained an "atmosphere of domination." Id. Interrogators were trained that this final
method may cause the suspect to talk, but that the questioner had not used duress or coercion. See id.
Authorities should use this extended interrogation, however, only "when the guilt of the subject
appear[ed] highly probable." Id (quoting CHARLES E. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION 112 (6th ed. 1994)).
11. Id. at 455.
12. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Per-
spective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV 1055, 1063, 1132
(1998) (asserting that the rate which police solve crimes, or "clearance rates," have declined because
of Miranda, causing society to bear the costs of restricting the abilities of police to solve crimes);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small
Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 503, 562 (1998) (arguing that the effects of Miranda on con-
viction rates are negligible because Miranda "does not protect suspects from conviction but only
from a particular method of conviction").
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risprudence, but [as] an application of principles long recognized and
applied in other settings.
' 3
It is well settled that a suspect must receive Miranda warnings be-
fore custodial interrogation." The Supreme Court, in Miranda, defined
custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement offi-
cers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way."'" Two issues are often
raised in conjunction with claims of Miranda violations.'6 First, whether
the suspect was in "custody," and second, whether the questioning rose
to the level of an "interrogation."''
1. Custody
Custody determinations generally revolve around when-not how-
authorities administered the Miranda warnings.'8 A police officer may
stop someone based upon a "reasonable belief"9 that a crime is being
contemplated or committed; the investigation may then give the officer
probable cause to make an "arrest."' This series of events produces diffi-
culties in pinpointing when the contact became custodial and, therefore,
when the Miranda warning is required." In determining whether a person
is in custody for the purposes of receiving Miranda warnings, courts look
at the totality of the circumstances to determine "whether there is a 'for-
13. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442. For a comparison of pre- and post-Miranda confession cases,
see Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TuL. L. REv. 2195 (1996). Hancock as-
serts that due process focuses on excluding coerced confessions, while Miranda seeks to prevent
them. See id. at 2201.
14. See Godsey, supra note 9, at 717 (stating that "Miranda warnings are not triggered until a
police officer subjects a person to 'custodial interrogation'").
15. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
16. See Godsey, supra note 9, at 717 (discussing the requirement that both "custody" and
"interrogation" exist).
17. See Laurie Magid, Questioning the Question-Proof Inmate: Defining Miranda Custody for
Incarcerated Suspects, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 901 (1997) (stating that the right to remain silent and
the right to counsel are triggered "by the simultaneous combination of custody and interrogation").
18. See United States v. McCrary, 643 F.2d 323, 330 n.l I (5th Cir. 1981) ("There is generally
no question as to the sufficiency of the [Miranda] warnings themselves. They are either given or
they are not given.").
19. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court held that, upon observation of
suspicious behavior, a police officer identifying herself as such, may make "reasonable inquiries."
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. If these inquiries do not dispel her suspicion of the danger to herself or the
public, she may "conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an at-
tempt to discover weapons." Id.
20. Arrest is the curtailment of the suspect's "freedom of action." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420,440 (1984).
21. See, e.g., Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440 (holding that the non-threatening nature of Terry
stops precludes the need for Miranda warnings). But see United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1466
(10th Cir. 1993) (finding that Miranda warnings were required in a Terry stop involving police
questioning of an individual on an isolated road with police guns drawn); United States v. Smith, 3
F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that custody existed during a Terry stop, therefore trigger-
ing Miranda, when police removed the individual from an automobile, separated him from his
companions, and placed him in handcuffs).
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mal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated
with a formal arrest."
2. Interrogation
With respect to interrogation, proscribed investigative techniques
are not limited to direct questions.' For Miranda purposes, interrogation
"refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions
on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest
and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response from the suspect."4
B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. United States v. Torres-Guevara'
a. Facts
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) Detective Michael Judd observed
suspicious behavior by Torres-Guevara in an airport.' Judd followed
Torres-Guevara outside the airport and saw her approached by Miguel
Garcia, another passenger on the flight.' Judd approached the couple
and, in English, identified himself as a police officer.' Judd then showed
his DEA credentials, but neither person responded.' After ascertaining
that they spoke and understood Spanish, Judd continued the conversation
22. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (citation omitted); see also Berkemer,
468 U.S. at 442 (stating that in determining whether a suspect is in custody, "the only relevant in-
quiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation");
People v. Horn, 790 P.2d 816, 818 (Colo. 1990) (stating that "the test for determining whether a
person is in custody is an objective one, which considers whether a reasonable person in the sus-
pect's position would believe that he is deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way");
William F. Nagel, The Differences Between the U.S. Supreme Court and the Colorado Supreme
Court on the Test for the Determination of Custody for Purposes of Miranda, 71 DENY. U. L. REV.
427, 427 (1994) (comparing Colorado's objective focus on feelings of freedom deprivation to the
Supreme Court's focus on the atmosphere of the interrogation).
23. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnote omitted).
24. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301.
25. 147 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 1998).
26. See Torres-Guevara, 147 F.3d at 1262-63. The suspicious behavior involved the defen-
dant's style of dress, body language, mannerisms, and place of departure. See id. at 1263. She wore a
long, baggy sweatshirt over a T-shirt. See id. She held her hands over her stomach, "as if she was
holding something in place." Id She walked quickly through the airport, made no eye contact, and
picked up no baggage. See id. Finally, she departed from Los Angeles, a "drug source" city. Id at
1262; cf Mark J. Kadish, The Drug Courier Profile: In Planes, Trains, and Automobiles; and Now
in the Jury Box, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 747, 753-54 (1997) (discussing the numerous and sometimes
overlapping characteristics that are part of various "drug carriee' profiles and what profiles trigger
arrest or detainment).




in Spanish." Without blocking their path, Judd advised them they were
free to leave and then asked if he could speak to them for a minute.3'
Both consented, and "Detective Judd again asked whether they under-
stood that they were not under arrest and that they were free to go."'
Both indicated their understanding."
Judd asked to see their identification and airline tickets?' Special
Agent Michael Eddington joined Judd at this time." Judd returned the tick-
ets and asked if either of them were carrying drugs or large amounts of
cash.' Garcia replied, "No." Torres-Guevara did not respond." Judd
asked Torres-Guevara if she understood the question; again, she did not
respond.-' Judd asked for "permission to search their persons." Garcia
consented, and during the search Judd reiterated to Garcia that he was not
under arrest."' Judd did not find anything on Garcia and waved him on."
Judd again asked to search Torres-Guevara, but she did not respond.'
When asked if she understood the question, again, she did not respond."
Judd told her that if she had drugs she should turn them over to him.' Ser-
geant Mark Whittaker joined the other two officers." In Spanish, he said to
Torres-Guevara, "You have drugs, don't you?"'7 She lowered her head and
did not respond.' Whittaker asked, "Don't you?" and she replied, "Yes."'9
Torres-Guevara indicated that the drugs were under her shirtr' Whit-
taker placed her under arrest, and they proceeded to an airport office so






35. See id. One of the elements the court considered in determining whether a consensual
encounter escalated into a seizure was whether "more than one officer confronted the subject." Id at
1264. Other factors included whether "the encounter occurred in a confined or nonpublic space; the
officers confronting the subject were armed or uniformed; ... the officers exhibited an intimidating







42. See id Torres-Guevara argued that because Garcia left only after being searched and after
Judd "waved him on," she felt that she could not leave until she agreed to be searched. Id at 1265.
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before being given a Miranda warning, Torres-Guevara started to cry and
said, '"This was my first time." 2 After they reached the office, and before a
Miranda warning had been given, Whittaker asked if the drugs were in her
stomach area? She responded by removing two, kilogram-size packages
of cocaine from under her shirt and placing them on the table. '
Torres-Guevara claimed that her admission to carrying drugs, and
the statement that it was her "first time" carrying drugs, should not have
been admitted at trial because officers failed to provide Miranda warn-
ings before interrogating her.'5 The district court denied Torres-
Guevara's motion to suppress?' The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed, concluding that Torres-Guevara made the incriminating state-
ments about carrying drugs while the encounter was still consensual and
that she had volunteered, rather than responded to police interrogation,
the statement that it was her "first time.
57
b. Decision
At issue were the two separate statements made by Torres-Guevara,
both of which came before she was given a Miranda warning." The ad-
missibility of these statements hinged on whether Torres-Guevara was in
police custody at the time she made them."9 The court looked at the "to-
tality of the circumstances"' to determine whether Torres-Guevara was
in custody6' and reviewed de novo the district court's finding that she was
not in custody.'
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the failure of the police to give the
Miranda warnings prior to the communication of the incriminating
statements was not a constitutional violation because the actions and
behavior of the police did not rise to the level of custodial interrogation
and, therefore, had not triggered Torres-Guevara's Fifth Amendment
Miranda rights. 3 Because Torres-Guevara made the admission to carry-
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. See id at 1263-64.
55. See id. at 1262.
56. See id.






63. id. The three types of encounters between an individual and the police identified by the
Tenth Circuit are
(1) consensual encounters which do not implicate the Fourth Amendment[;] (2) investi-
gative detentions which are Fourth Amendment seizures of limited scope and duration
and must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity[;] and (3) arrests,




ing drugs during a consensual search, ' as opposed to while in custody,'
the Miranda warning was not required." Additionally, the court found
that Torres-Guevara's statement that it was her "first time" carrying
drugs was admissible because she volunteered the statement, rather than
giving it in response to police interrogation. '7
2. United States v. Benally"
a. Facts
After finding a dead body near the house Benally lived in, police of-
ficers contacted Benally's mother. ' The police asked her to come to the
station and bring any members of the household present on the night the
victim was killed, in the hope that someone in the household had seen or
heard something helpful to the investigation." The authorities inter-
viewed Benally and his mother for twenty to thirty minutes, who then
went home following the interview." Later that day, the police asked
Id. (quoting United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1500 (10th Cir.1996)).
64. See id. at 1266. A consensual search is a search where the defendant is free to leave at any
time. See id. An objective test of whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would feel
free to leave is applied. See id. at 1264 (citing United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1498 (10th
Cir. 1996)).
65. See id. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered certain relevant factors in deter-
mining whether a search escalates into a seizure. See id. at 1264. These factors included: the type of
setting where the encounter happened, whether the officers were armed or uniformed, whether
coercive or intimidating tactics were employed, and whether potentially incriminating questions
were asked. See id. at 1264-65; cf United States v. Acklin, No. 97-6244, 1998 WL 110430 (10th
Cir. Mar. 13, 1998). In Acklin, authorities arrested the defendant on drug charges after a consensual
search outside an airport. See Acklin, 1998 WL 110430, at *2. Acklin argued that the encounter was
custodial at the time the police approached her because the police had a "subjective but unexpressed
belief they had sufficient probable cause to hold her based on the drug profile information." Id. She
argued that because the encounter was custodial from the start, the police erred in not informing her
of her Miranda rights when she was initially approached. See id. The court rejected her argument,
stating: "The subjective intentions or state of mind of either the defendant or police [are] irrele-
vant.. .. "Id. at *3.
66. See Torres-Guevara, 147 F.3d at 1266. "Miranda warnings are required only when a
suspect is in custody." Id. The court looked at the "totality of the circumstances" in finding that the
defendant was not in custody. Id Relevant factors included: the authorities approached the defendant
in a public area, they did not prevent her from leaving, they did not produce weapons, they did not
threaten the defendant, they promptly returned examined tickets and identification, and they clearly
told the defendant that she was not under arrest and was free to leave. See id. at 1265.
67. Id. at 1266; see also United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1022 (10th Cir. 1993) ("If a
person voluntarily speaks without interrogation by an officer, the Fifth Amendment's protection is
not at issue, and the statements are admissible.").
68. 146F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1998).
69. See Benally, 146 F.3d at 1239.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 1239. In California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983), the Supreme Court held
that Miranda warnings were not required where the suspect was not placed under arrest, voluntarily
came to the police station, and left without incident following a brief interview. See Beheler, 463
U.S. at 1121-22. In Benally, there was no arrest during the first meeting, the parties voluntarily came
to the police station, and the interview lasted less than thirty minutes. See Benally, 146 F.3d at 1239.
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Benally to return because his earlier statements did not make sense."
After being Mirandized and questioned for ninety minutes, Benally ad-
mitted to being present during the victim's murder.73
A jury convicted Benally of voluntary manslaughter.7' On appeal, he
claimed that the district court should have suppressed statements he
made'during both interviews, arguing that they were made during custo-
dial interrogations, but before authorities informed him of his Miranda
rights.'3
b. Decision
The admissibility of the incriminating statements depended on
whether Benally was in custody when he made those statements.76
Benally argued that his initial interview was custodial. ' Because the de-
termination of custody is "fact intensive," the Tenth Circuit reviewed for
"clear error" the district court's finding that Benally was not in custody.
To determine whether Benally was in custody for Miranda pur-
poses, the Tenth Circuit evaluated whether police formally arrested
Benally or if the police restrained his freedom of movement to the point
where it objectively appeared he was in custody.' The court emphasized
that the presence of either of these conditions established the existence of
custody for Miranda purposes.'
Benally pointed to his mother's testimony that she felt "compelled"
to submit to an interview." He argued that "demanding his mother's
presence at the police station... curtailed his freedom of action as
well." The court, however, rejected Benally's claim because there was
no testimony showing that Benally heard his mother express this senti-
ment at the time of her interview.83 Benally also claimed that he was not
Mirandized before the second interview.' After independently reviewing
These factors led the Tenth Circuit to conclude that the defendant's Miranda rights were not trig-
gered at this initial meeting. See id.
72. See Benally, 146 F.3d at 1239.
73. See id.
74. See id at 1234.
75. Seeid. at1238-39.
76. See id. at 1239.
77. See id. at 1238.
78. Id. at 1239.
79. See id.
80. See id.; see also California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) ("The ultimate inquiry
[of whether a suspect is in custody] is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on free-
dom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." (citation omitted)).






the record, the court rejected the argument, finding "adequate evidence to
the contrary.""
C. Other Circuits
In Torres-Guevara and Benally, the Tenth Circuit rejected the de-
fendants' claims that custodial interrogation preceded their Miranda
warning. Other circuits also evidence a reluctance to find that custodial
interrogation occurred prior to the administration of Miranda warnings. 6
The facts in United States v. Yusuff,8 a Seventh Circuit case, are similar
to those in Torres-Guevara.8 In Yusuff, officers on drug interdiction op-
erations approached Yusuff in an airport." Yusuff answered questions
and consented to a pat down search.' The agent felt a hard lump in her
jacket pocket.9' When asked, "What is that?" she replied, "Drugs."
When asked the quantity, she replied, "700 grams."93 The authorities then
took Yusuff to a less crowded area, where she opened her coat and re-
moved a plastic bundle from underneath her clothes." After opening the
package, the agents arrested Yusuff and advised her of her Miranda
rights."
Yusuff sought to exclude her statement that the lump consisted of
drugs, claiming that the agents were conducting a custodial interrogation
and, therefore, they should have given the Miranda warning." In reject-
ing this argument, the Seventh Circuit focused on the fact that the pat
down was consensual and had occurred in a busy, public area.97 Addi-
tionally, the court pointed out that "[m]oments before the pat down, the
officers.., told [the defendant] that she was not under arrest and was
85. Id. The court also rejected the defendant's claim that his statements were involuntary. See
id. The court reviewed the factors that pointed to a coerced confession, stating that a finding of
coercion comes from the totality of the surrounding circumstances, with no single factor being
determinative. See id. at 1240. The court evaluated the following factors in determining the defen-
dant's statements at both interviews were voluntary: "(1) the age, intelligence, and education of the
defendant; (2) the length of the detention; (3) the length and nature of the questioning; (4) whether
the defendant was advised of [his] constitutional rights; and (5) whether the defendant was subjected
to physical punishment." Id. at 1239-40 (citation omitted). The court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment in part because of the non-coercive environment of the interviews and its finding that the
defendant received a Miranda warning prior to the second interview. See id. at 1240.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Shea, 150 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 199 S. Ct. 568
(1998); United States v. Yusuff, 96 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 1996).
87. Yusuff, 96 F.3d at 982.
88. See United States v. Torres-Guevara, 147 F.3d 1261, 1261--64 (10th Cir. 1998).






95. See id. at 984-85.
96. See id. at 987.
97. See id. at 988.
1999]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
free to leave." The only reason Yusuff did not feel free to leave was
because she knew the lump consisted of drugs and "that a reasonable
person, after consenting to a brief pat down search in a busy airport,
would not believe themselves in custody if an officer felt a lump (e.g., a
back brace or purse) and asked what it was."" Therefore, the agent's
"question of 'What's this?' did not turn the consensual encounter into
custodial interrogation requiring the Miranda warnings."'"
In United States v. Shea,'0 ' FBI agents arrested Shea for his part in
an attempted bank robbery." After his arrest, but before authorities ad-
vised him of his Miranda rights, Shea made several incriminating state-
ments that prosecutors subsequently used against him at trial.' 3 Shea
argued that the district court should have suppressed these statements
because he made them during a custodial interrogation, but before the
agents advised him of his Miranda rights.' There was no dispute that
Shea was in custody at the time he made the incriminating statements."
As for the existence of interrogation, Shea argued that the number of
agents and degree of force used in his arrest was the equivalent of inter-
rogation.'" The court rejected this argument, however, finding that
Shea's statements were "spontaneous utterances" and there was no evi-
dence suggesting any agent tried to elicit or coerce incriminating state-
ments from him.'
D. Analysis
The determination of whether a person is in custody, or is being in-
terrogated, can be a "fine line.' ' " The previous two cases demonstrate the
Tenth Circuit's analysis in determining whether the police cross that
line.'" While these holdings do not represent new positions for the Tenth




101. United States v. Shea, 150 F.3d 44 (1 st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 199 S. Ct. 568 (1998).
102. See Shea, 150 F.3d at 47. Authorities charged the defendant with conspiracy to commit
armed bank robbery, attempted bank robbery, use and carrying of firearms during and in relation to a
crime of violence, and felon in possession of ammunition. See id.
103. See id. The following statements were made: "'How did you know I was here?'; 'Where
did you come from?'; 'I should have gone home.'; 'What do you got me for, a stolen jeep?'; 'What
am I going to get for bank robbery, forty years? I'll be out when I'm seventy."' Id
104. See id.
105. See id. at 48.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) ("[T]he interrogation process is 'inherently
coercive' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently
traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissi-
ble compulsion." (quoting New York v. Quarles 467 U.S. 649,656 (1984)).
109. See United States v. Torres-Guevara, 147 F.3d 1261, 1266 (10th Cir. 1998); United States
v. Benally, 146 F.3d 1232, 1238-39 (10th Cir. 1998).
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rowing the scope of Miranda. 0 For example, in Torres-Guevara, the
court stated that "[a] limited number of routine questions... followed by
a question about possession of contraband and a request to search, are
not sufficient to render an otherwise consensual encounter coercive.""'
From the detainee's perspective, however, it is unlikely there is anything
routine about being questioned by three plain-clothes officers outside an
airport.
The Tenth Circuit has addressed the conflict surrounding Miranda
in much the same way as courts across the country--courts continue to
limit the applicability of the Miranda procedural protections."' These
decisions are important because they reflect societal demands that courts
be "tough on crime.""' Because many perceive Miranda as impeding the
ability of the police to obtain confessions, criticism of the decision has
been fierce."' Additionally, the belief that Miranda was an unwarranted
expansion of the Constitution,"' has led critics to assail the decision on
legal grounds."6
110. See United States v. Leach, 749 F.2d 592, 598-99 (10th Cir. 1984) (affirming the trial
court's finding that there was no custodial interrogation and, thus, no Miranda requirement, when
the defendant chose the time and location to speak with Secret Service Agents concerning his al-
leged counterfeiting). But see United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1466 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating
that Miranda was required in a Terry stop in which the police questioned the individual on an iso-
lated road with their guns drawn).
11. Torres-Guevara, 147 F.3d at 1265 (citation omitted).
112. A recent exception to this is United States v. Dickerson, No. 97-4750, 1999 WL 61200, at
*1, "20-'21 (4th Cir. Feb. 8, 1999)). See discussion infra note 339.
113. Robert J. Cottrol, Submission Is Not the Answer: Lethal Violence, Microcultures of Crimi-
nal Violence and the Right to Self-Defense, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 1029, 1080 n.2 (1998); see Mi-
chelle Johnson, The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and the Sentencing of Sexual Predators, 8 S.
CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 39, 39 (1998) (discussing how following public opinion lends legiti-
macy to the Court).
114. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 538 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that
confessions, "[plarticularly when corroborated, as where the police have confirmed the accused's
disclosure of the hiding place of implements or fruits of the crime... have the highest reliability and
significantly contribute to the certitude with which we may believe the accused is guilty"); Cassell &
Fowles, supra note 12, at 1055 (claiming that the Miranda decision "handcuffled] the cops"); David
Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063,
1080-83 (1986) (criticizing Miranda because the Fifth Amendment only protects against self-
incrimination in judicial proceedings, not during interrogation); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda
Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 99, 106 (stating that Miranda was one of the
Warren Court's most controversial criminal procedure decisions).
115. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
116. See Robert Hardaway & Douglas B. Tumminello, Pretrial Publicity in Criminal Cases of
National Notoriety: Constructing a Remedy for the Remediless Wrong, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 39, 88
(1996) (stating that critics of Miranda consider it "judicial legislation," and that Miranda tactics are
better suited "for a police manual than for a constitutional decision"); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of
Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 622 (1996) (stating that after Miranda, a
movement arose to impeach Chief Justice Earl Warren and that "[tihe U.S. Department of Justice's
Office of Legal Policy under the Reagan Administration characterized the decision as illegitimate in
a 120 page report recommending that the Department of Justice urge the Supreme Court to overrule
Miranda altogether").
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There are two great forces working against the prospects of over-
ruling Miranda. Adherence to precedence always constrains the Court, to
some degree, in its subsequent decisions."7 The second factor is far more
difficult to quantify. For better or worse, Miranda is a part of the Ameri-
can culture."' While political, legal, and media organizations have at-
tacked and ridiculed Miranda,"9 it is often the first thing an accused
thinks of when dealing with the police.'" Therefore, overruling Miranda
could cause a popular "backlash" against police, bringing with it distrust
and resentment towards law enforcement and the courts.'2'
II. WAIVER OF A DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS UNDER MIRANDA
A. Background
The Fifth Amendment protects individuals against self-
incrimination in criminal matters." Miranda emphasized the need to
protect against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation, because
"[a]s a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of
the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official in-
vestigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against
intimidation or trickery."'"
Simply reciting the Miranda warning does not ensure the admissi-
bility of subsequent statements by a suspect." Prior to interrogation, the
117. Although the Supreme Court has not overruled Miranda, the Court has extended the use of
harmless error analysis to "dilute the practical effect of" Miranda. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona
v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV.
152, 157-58 (1991); see also Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and
Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2036 (1996) (stating that "stare decisis remains far
more than a mere echo in our legal culture. At the very least, it is a formidable obstacle to any court
seeking to change its own law. And, of course, it still rigidly binds lower courts to much existing
case law.").
118. See United States v. McCrary, 643 F.2d 323, 330 n.l 1 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Most ten year old
children who are permitted to stay up late enough to watch police shows on television can probably
recite [the Miranda warning] as well as any police officer").
119. See Leo, supra note 116, at 622 (discussing the reaction to Miranda by police, politicians,
President Nixon, the Congress, newspaper editorials, and cartoonists).
120. See generally J.M. Balking, What Is Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH.L. REV.
1966 (1992). Balking discusses the status of Miranda in the culture and how the mass media influ-
ences public perception of legal rights. See id. at 1981. He reports that in Canada, Canadian motor-
ists have demanded that they be read their Miranda rights. See id.
121. Leo, supra note 116, at 680.
122. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself .... ).
123. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,461 (1966).
124. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 452-53 (1986) (Stevens. J., dissenting) (arguing that
Miranda clearly condemns threats or trickery that cause a suspect to make an unwise waiver of his
rights even though he fully understands those rights); see also Leo, supra note 116, at 621 (stating
that "[albsent a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the prophylactic Miranda warnings,
any admission or confession will be excluded from evidence in subsequent trial proceedings").
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
police must obtain a waiver of the suspect's rights;' suspects must waive
their rights "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently."' 6 If a waiver is
absent or improper, courts will exclude subsequent evidence.'"
A valid waiver must contain two components." First, suspects must
waive their rights without police coercion.'" Additionally, a suspect must
have an understanding of the "nature of the right being abandoned and
the consequences of the decision to abandon it."'" The Miranda court
stated that the government bore the "heavy burden" of proving the valid-
ity of a waiver."'
A suspect's "mental illness" may affect his ability to make a valid
Miranda waiver.' The mental condition of a suspect, however, does not
control the "voluntariness" analysis. 3 Absent a finding of police coer-
cion, courts will likely uphold the validity of a waiver by a mentally im-
paired suspect."
125. In Miranda, the Court carefully distinguished between statements voluntarily made to
police and those brought about via interrogation:
There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that
he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or
any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred
by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 (footnote omitted).
126. Id. at 444. In a subsequent case, the Court set out a two-tiered test for a valid waiver.
First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the
product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.
Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the
right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the
"totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation" reveal both an uncoerced
choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the
Miranda rights have been waived.
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (citation omitted).
127. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 ("But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demon-
strated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used
against [the defendant].") (footnote omitted); ;f. Leo, supra note 116, at 621. But see Yale Kamisar,
On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 929, 940 (1995) (commenting on an article which proposed that during a pretrial hearing,
the government should be able to compel a suspect to give information to convict the suspect).
128. See Moran, 475 U.S. at 421.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
132. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 162 (1986).
133. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164.
134. See id. at 165. But see Miller v. Dugger, 838 F.2d 1530, 1539 (11 th Cir. 1988) (stating that
a Miranda waiver of a mentally ill person may be invalid if it is not made knowingly); Common-
wealth v. Cephas, 522 A.2d 63, 64-65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (finding that a Miranda waiver was not
made knowingly and was, therefore, invalid, when the defendant suffered from chronic undifferenti-
ated schizophrenia, police knew the defendant suffered from mental illness, and the defendant "ex-
hibited bizarre and psychotic behavior" in the detention room).
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B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. United States v. Gell-Iren3 5
a. Facts
FBI agents arrested Gell-Iren for possession and intent to distribute
drugs.' According to law enforcement personnel testimony, after the
arrest, an agent read Gell-Iren his Miranda rights in Gell-lren's principal
language, Spanish. "7 When the authorities asked Gell-Iren if he under-
stood his rights, he replied, "Yes."'38 Gell-Iren, however, later "testified
that he ... told the agents he understood his rights 'a little bit' and that
he... believed that his statements would not be used against him."'3"
After indicating that he understood his rights, Gell-Iren asked to
speak with an agent."a Although Gell-Iren had not signed a waiver of
rights form, he incriminated himself to the agent by stating that he had
purchased the drugs, kept them in his van overnight, and delivered the
drugs to his buyer.''
A district court jury convicted Gell-ren of possession with intent to
distribute heroin. 2 On appeal, he argued that the district court should not
have admitted the post-arrest statements for two reasons."' First, he did
not sign a form waiving his Miranda rights, and second, he made state-
ments to an officer other than the one that Mirandized him.'"
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit began with Gell-Iren's claim that the trial court
should have suppressed his statements because he did not sign a waiver
of rights form. " By a preponderance of the evidence, the government
had to prove that his choice to waive his rights was "free and deliberate,"
135. 146 F.3d 827 (10th Cir. 1998).
136. See Gell-Iren, 146 F.3d at 829.
137. See id. See generally Richard W. Cole & Laura Maslow-Armand, The Role of Counsel and
the Courts in Addressing Foreign Language and Cultural Barriers at Different Stages of a Criminal
Proceeding, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 193, 202--04 (1997) (reviewing approaches taken by different
courts concerning language barriers when administering the Miranda warning).
138. Gell-Iren, 146 F.3d at 829.
139. Id. at 830. The court stated that the defendant's testimony was not credible, while the
agent's testimony was credible. Id. See generally Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in
Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425, 428-29 (1996) (discussing the occurrence and differentiation
of lying told by police to suspects during interrogation).
140. See Gell-Iren, 146 F.3d at 829.
141. See id. at 830.
142. See i at 829.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 830.
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and not the product of "intimidation, coercion, or deception.'"" The court
explained that a waiver is only required to be "clear," it need not be ex-
press) 7
The court stated that "[wihere a defendant's actions clearly demon-
strate that he... voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, his failure to
sign a waiver of rights form does not render his waiver involuntary."'" In
this case, two actions by Gell-Iren were relevant to the court in deter-
mining that his waiver was voluntary. 9 First, he indicated that he under-
stood his rights and the authorities informed him of them, and second, he
gave information to the agents even though he knew he was not required
to provide such information.'"
Gell-Iren's also claimed that the district court should have sup-
pressed his statements because the authorities did not re-Mirandize him
after a new questioner substituted the original questioner-the one who
provided the initial Miranda warning.'' The court disagreed, stating that
Gell-Iren "must have known that his rights had not materially changed"
due to the existence of a new questioner 2 and that a "Miranda warning
does not lose its efficacy if a defendant is warned by one officer and then
interrogated by another."'53
2. United States v. Bautista'4
a. Facts
On April 5, 1996, FBI Special Agents Leggitt and Kohl interviewed
Bautista in his home regarding the murder of Bautista's friend.'" OnJune
26, 1996, Leggitt and FBI Special Agent Schum returned to Bautista's
home and requested that he accompany them to the police department for
further discussions.'" FBI Special Agent Langenberg joined the question-
ing at the station."
The agents told Bautista that they believed he knew more about the
victim's death than he previously indicated, and that they wanted to find
out "what really happened."'5 8 Bautista's story, however, remained consis-
146. 1d. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 42 F.3d 1312, 1318 (10th Cir. 1994)).
147. Id; see infra note 248.





152. Id. at 830-31 (quoting United States v. Andaverde, 64 F.3d 1305, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995)).
153. Id. at 831 (quoting Andaverde, 64 F.3d at 1312).
154. 145 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 255 (1998).
155. See Bautista, 145 F.3d ait 1143.
156. See id. at 1143-44.
157. See id. at 1144.
158. Id.
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tent.9 Leggitt then told Bautista, "This is really serious. We need the truth,
and before we do that we need to advise you of your rights.""'W Leggitt read
Bautista's Miranda rights.'6 ' Bautista "refused to sign the waiver of rights
form and stated that he did not want to answer any more questions.'" 2
Bautista agreed to be fingerprinted and, after the other agents departed,
Schum continued the questioning.'"
Bautista admitted to being present when the victim died; He then
told Schurn that he didn't want to say anything else until he had spoken
with a lawyer." The authorities fingerprinted Bautista and took him
home.'" On July 2, 1996, agents arrested Bautista and brought him in for
more questioning.67 Leggitt again read Bautista his Miranda rights.' 6 Bau-
tista waived his rights and agreed to answer questions.69 Bautista con-
fessed to stabbing the victim and signed a confession written out by Agent
Leggitt.
7 0
A jury convicted Bautista of second-degree murder. 7' On appeal,
Bautista argued that the district court should have suppressed his June 26.72
and July 2 statements.' 73 Bautista sought to have his July 2 confession sup-












170. See id. at 1144-45.
171. See i.
172. See id. Bautista argued that the trial court should have suppressed his June 26 statements
because police officers violated his rights by continuing the interrogation after he expressly invoked
his right to remain silent under Miranda. See iL Furthermore, he argued that once he invoked his
right to counsel on June 26, under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981), police should have
refrained from further interrogation until they supplied him counsel. See Bautista, 145 F.3d at 1145.
Edwards held:
[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial inter-
rogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he re-
sponded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of
his rights. We further hold that an accused .... having expressed his desire to deal with
the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities
until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.
Edwards, 451 U.S. 484-85 (footnote omitted).
173. See Bautista, 145 F.3d at 1145.
174. See id. The defendant also asserted that the July 2 confession was inadmissible as "fruit of
the poisonous tree." Id For a discussion of this doctrine in relation to Miranda, see Paul G. Cassell,
The Costs of the Miranda Mandate: A Lesson in the Dangers of Inflexible, "Prophylactic" Supreme
Court Inventions, 28 ARtz. ST. L.J. 299, 302 (1996) (arguing that the doctrine applies only to con-
stitutional violations, not Miranda violations).
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his July 2 waiver was invalid because he had inyoked his Miranda rights
on June 26, but police continued the interrogation without providing coun-
sel."5 He argued that in the absence of the requested counsel he could not
properly or voluntarily waive his rights on July 2 prior to his confession.'7"
b. Decision
The relevant issue before the court centered on the validity of Bauti-
sta's Miranda waiver on July 2." Bautista argued that his July 2 waiver
was involuntary and therefore invalid because the authorities denied him
counsel after invoking his Miranda right to such counsel on June 26."7
The court found that because Bautista was never in custody on June 26,
his invocation of Miranda was ineffective."' Accordingly, the court only
analyzed whether Bautista made the waiver voluntarily and knowingly."
The court stated that for a waiver to be voluntary, the totality of the cir-
cumstances must show that "(1) the waiver was a product of a free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception, and (2)
the waiver was made in full awareness of the nature of the right being
waived and the consequences of waiving."' 8'
175. See Bautista, 145 F.3d at 1145.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 1148. The Tenth Circuit also analyzed whether the trial court should have sup-
pressed Bautista's July 26 statements. See id. at 1145. The appeals court stated that "[aibsent either a
custodial situation or official interrogation, Miranda and Edwards are not implicated," and that "any
statement given in violation of the rules established in these cases cannot be introduced as evidence
in the state's case-in-chief." id. at 1147-48. Bautista argued that the interrogation became custodial
when he was Mirandized on June 26. See id at 1147-48. Therefore, Edwards should have barred the
July 2 interrogation. See id. at 1145. The government argued that because Bautista was not in cus-
tody on June 26, Miranda was not applicable, and that the agent's unnecessary advisement of
Miranda had no bearing. See id. at 1145-46.
The Tenth Circuit stated that "although giving a Miranda warning does not, in and of
itself, convert an otherwise non-custodial interrogation into a custodial interrogation, it is a factor to
be considered by the court." Id. at 1148 (citing United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 446, 449 (6th Cir.
1977)). In Lewis, the Sixth Circuit held that the giving of Miranda rights does not produce a custo-
dial interrogation. See Lewis, 556 F.2d at 449 ("The precaution of giving Miranda rights in what is
thought could be a non-custodial interview should not be deterred by interpreting the giving of such
rights as a restraint on the suspect, converting a non-custodial interview into a custodial interrogation
for Miranda purposes."). The Tenth Circuit expressed concern that the interrogation may have
become custodial, but stated "we decline to discuss this issue further since our result would be the
same under either conclusion." Bautista, 145 F.3d at 1149.
The Tenth Circuit found that Bautista's interrogation on July 2 did not violate Edwards.
See id. at 1150. Custodial interrogations are by nature coercive, and Edwards was intended to pre-
vent police from continually harassing and questioning a suspect in custody who has invoked his
right to have an attorney present. See id. Because Bautista was released for a significant amount of
time between interrogations, however, the coercive atmosphere dissipated, and Edwards was not
violated. See id.
178. See Bautista, 145 F.3d at 1145.
179. See id. at 1150; see also discussion supra note 177.
180. See Bautista, 145 F.3d at 1150.
181. Id. at 1149.
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The court noted that according to the record, only twenty minutes
passed between the time agents arrested Bautista and when they admin-
istered the Miranda warning," and that it was only another eighty min-
utes until the authorities finished taking his confession.'83 The court stated
that there was no indication of intimidation, coercion, or deception on the
part of the authorities and, therefore, held that Bautista waived his rights
"voluntarily and knowingly.""'
C. Other Circuits
In United States v. Salameh,'85 FBI agents arrested appellant Abou-
halima for his role in the bombing of the World Trade Center Complex
in New York City." Subsequent to his arrest and after agents advised
him of his rights,'" Abouhalima agreed to answer the agents' questions.'
During the interrogation he made incriminating statements linking him to
the bombing.'" Abouhalima was convicted in district court and, on ap-
peal, argued that his waiver was invalid because it came after he had
endured ten days of torture in Egypt.'" The Second Circuit rejected this
argument, stating that Abouhalima was not entitled to a suppression
hearing because there was no evidence that agents of the United States
engaged in coercive tactics.'"' Although it was possible that actions taken
by Egyptian police weakened Abouhalima's mental state, courts are not
required to look at a defendant's motivation for speaking when the ac-
tions of U.S. officials are not at issue.'" Because Abouhalima did not
allege physical or mental coercion by U.S. agents during the interview
when he made the incriminating statements, the court found no constitu-
tional violation.'"
In United States v. Schwensow,'" Schwensow argued against the va-
lidity of his Miranda waiver because the effects of alcohol withdrawal
and anti-anxiety medication prevented the waiver from being knowing
and voluntary.'" After a five-week drinking binge, Schwensow sought
182. See id.
183. See id. The court's reasoning seemed to suggest that police did not have time to coerce or
force a confession from the defendant.
184. Id.
185. 152 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom., Abouhalima v. United States, 119 S.
Ct. 885 (1999).
186. See Salameh, 152 F.3d at 105.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 117.
189. See id.
190. See id. The defendant argued that the district court's failure to hold a suppression hearing




194. 151 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 1998).
195. See Schwensow, 151 F.3d at 660.
[Vol. 76:3
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
out a detoxification center.' Unable to remember the name or address of
a previously recommended center, he visited a nearby Alcoholic
Anonymous office.'" Volunteers staffed the office, which served only as
a telephone hotline.'" A volunteer helped Schwensow locate a detoxifi-
cation center and agreed to drive Schwensow to the center.' Schwensow
asked if they could stop at a friend's house on the way in order to drop
off a duffel bag he was carrying.' To prevent Schwensow from getting
sidetracked, the volunteer offered to store the bag at the office until
Schwensow completed his detoxification.' After taking him to the cen-
ter, the volunteers opened the duffel bag, fearing it contained
contraband.' They found a semi-automatic pistol, sawed-off shotgun,
and various burglary paraphernalia. 3 The staff notified the authorities,
who arrested Schwensow at the detoxification center on an outstanding
warrant.' Schwensow waived his Miranda rights after receiving them
from the police, and denied ownership of the weapons found in the bag!'
After spending the next day in the hospital Schwensow was again ques-
tioned.' He received and waived his Miranda rights again, and told the
detective that "the items in the bag were his and that he had intended to
sell them."' Upon review of the record, the court found that Schwen-
sow's argument that "delirium tremens, blackouts, and hallucinations"
rendered his waiver invalid was not supported by fact.2m The court con-
cluded that Schwensow was not impaired and that his waiver was there-
fore valid.'
In United States v. Peck,20 law enforcement officers arrested appel-
lant Peck for possession with intent to distribute drugs.2 ' After the






202. See id. at 653.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id. Schwensow then denied a request to search his apartment and stated that he was
"dying of a progressive liver disease." Id. Although he never expressly invoked his right to silence,
the police officer took the combination of responses to mean that Schwensow did not want to talk
about the case. See id. at 658 n.5. The district court concluded that Schwensow invoked his right to
silence, and the circuit court followed the district court's finding. See id.
206. See id. at 653.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 660.
209. See id. The court also held that questioning Schwensow on December 1, thirty-six hours
after he invoked his Miranda rights, was not a violation because police waited a significant amount
of time between interrogations and provided a fresh set of Miranda warning before the second inter-
rogation. See id. at 658; cf Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (holding that police may
recommence interrogation if the defendant's original request to cease questioning was "scrupulously
honored").
210. United States v. Peck, 161 F.3d 1171 (8th Cir. 1998).
211. See Peck, 161 F.3dat 1172-73.
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authorities Mirandized and took Peck into custody, he signed a "'state-
ment of cooperation' which stated that he was aware of his right to speak
with an attorney and that he could stop cooperating at any time."2 12 Peck
incriminated himself,"3 and the district court utilized these statements
were to categorize him as a "career offender.'"' Peck claimed that be-
cause he did not know the possible "adverse impact his statements could
have on sentencing,"2" his waiver was not "intelligent and knowledge-
able," and was therefore invalid.t 6 The Eight Circuit rejected Peck's
claims, stating that "[1]ack of awareness of the potential adverse impact
of statements is not sufficient in itself to invalidate a waiver of the right
to counsel." ' 7
In general, circuit court's were more likely to find a waiver invalid
in cases where the defendant's mental capabilities were at issue or where
a defendant's right to remain silent was not "scrupulously honored.""' In
United States v. Garibay,2 9 the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded
Garibay's drug conviction because the prosecution did not show that
Garibay knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.' Cus-
toms agents arrested Garibay at the U.S.-Mexico border after finding
approximately 135 pounds of marijuana in a hidden compartment in his
car. 2' Two agents questioned the defendant after he waited in a holding
cell for approximately one hour." They asked Garibay if he understood
English.' He replied, "Yes," and an agent read Garibay his Miranda
212. Id. at 1173.
213. Peck incriminated himself by discussing his involvement with drug sales prior to his
arrest. See id. This included receiving several shipments of methamphetamine, each weighing over
eight ounces, and receiving one thousand pounds of marijuana. See id.
214. Id. To meet the requirements for a career offender, a defendant must have at least two
prior felonies involving violence or controlled substances within the last ten years. See id.; see also
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 4A1.2, 4BI.l (1997). He was sentenced for two other
drug convictions, in September 1986 and July 1995. See Peck, 161 F.3d at 1173. Based on his in-
criminating statements, the district court concluded that his conduct in relation to the instant offense
had begun in early 1996, thereby qualifying him as a career offender. See id
215. Peck, 161 F.3dat 1173-74.
216. Id. at 1173. Peck also argued that his statements should have been suppressed because he
was tired after a long bus ride before he met the police and that officers suggested he would receive
leniency if he cooperated. See id.
217. Id. The court also rejected Peck's argument that his statements were involuntary, because
he did not show that his will was "overborne." Id. at 1174 (citing United States v. Meirovitz, 918
F.2d 1376, 1379 (8th Cir. 1990) ("The appropriate test for determining the voluntariness of a confes-
sion is whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, pressures exerted upon the suspect have
overborne his will." (internal quotation marks omitted))).
218. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (holding that police may recommence
interrogation if the defendant's original request to cease questioning was "scrupulously honored").
219. 143 F.3d 534 (9th Cir. 1998).
220. See Garibay, 143 F.3d at 537.





rights in English. ' After orally waiving his rights,'m Garibay made in-
criminating statements.'6 On appeal, Garibay successfully argued that his
waiver was invalid because of his "limited-English skills and low mental
capacity."' The court stated that the prosecution bears the burden of
proving that Garibay waived his Miranda rights knowingly and intelli-
genly.' In finding that the prosecution failed to meet its burden, the
court pointed to Garibay's "English-language difficulties, borderline
retarded IQ, and poor verbal comprehension skills."' 9
In United States v. Tyler,' the authorities arrested Tyler for mur-
dering a government informant the day before she was supposed to tes-
tify against his brother.f' Police read Tyler his Miranda warning, and
Tyler said that he did not wish to make a statement.f2 Police ceased inter-
rogation, transferred him from the station to the barracks, and placed him
in a small room at approximately 10:00 P.M.23 On the walls was a "time-
line of the murder investigation and crime scene photographs, including
two photographs of the body of [the victim] (one of which was in
color)."2"' Police spoke with Tyler about his education; his mother's
health, hunting, and other subjects until approximately 10:55 P.M.' 35 At
that time Tyler began to cry, and an officer in the room told him to "tell
the truth. 2 .1 After an officer re-Mirandized Tyler, he gave incriminating
statements.237 The police obtained another incriminating statement from
Tyler on July 20," s after what the government claimed were repeated
Miranda warnings and Tyler's oral waiver of his rights.f9 Tyler argued
that the trial court should have suppressed his 10:55 P.M. statement on
July 9 and his July 20 statement because they came after he invoked his
right to remain silent.' The Third Circuit stated: "The appropriate in-
quiry under Miranda and its progeny, however, is not simply whether
Tyler knowingly waived his rights after receiving appropriate warnings.
224. See id.
225. See id. The court chastised the government's policy against using written waivers in either
English or Spanish at the border. See id. at 540.
226. See id. at 536. The defendant's incriminating statements included that he was paid one-
hundred dollars to drive the car across the boarder and leave it at an arranged drop off location. See
id. at 536 n.2.
227. id. at 536.
228. See id. The burden must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. See id.
229. Id. at 538.
230. 164 F.3d 150 (3rd Cir. 1998).
231. See Tyler, 164 F.3d at 151-52.
232. See id. at 152.
233. See id.
234. Id. at 153.
235. See id. at 152.
236. Id. at 155.
237. See id. Tyler incriminated himself by saying that his brother wanted to kill the victim. See
id
238. See id.
239. See id. This time, Tyler stated that his brother only wanted to scare the victim. See id.
240. See id. at 152.
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Rather, the inquiry is whether the police 'scrupulously honored' Tyler's
assertion of his right to remain silent."2"' The court overruled the district
court's admission of the July 9 statements because the "mantra-like reci-
tation of Miranda warnings" and command to "tell the truth" were the
"antithesis of scrupulously honoring Tyler's right to remain 'silent."'
Additionally, the court stated that the record did not allow it to determine
the validity of Tyler's alleged waiver on July 20.23 The court took ex-
ception to the district court's statements that "there is nothing in the rec-
ord to support an argument that Defendant's waiver was not knowingly
made."' This suggested that the district court improperly reversed the
burden to Tyler to show the invalidity of his Miranda waiver.'
D. Analysis
One cannot overstate the value of a confession for the prosecution.'
Therefore, it is not surprising that Miranda's requirement that police
obtain a waiver before trying to illicit a confession has been assailed as
interfering with the efforts of law enforcement. ' Recent Supreme Court
decisions have made it easier for police to obtain Miranda waivers.2 ' As
evidenced in the Tenth Circuit cases discussed in this section, if the rec-
ord does not show coercion or manipulation, the likelihood of having a
waiver overturned on review is slight."'
The previous cases demonstrate three significant aspects to the va-
lidity of a Miranda waiver. First, a waiver does not require a signed af-
firmation by the suspect.' Second, a suspect can neither invoke nor
241. Id. at 154.
242. Id. at 155.
243. See id. at 152.
244. Id. at 156 (citation omitted).
245. See id.
246. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139 (1968) (White, J., dissenting) ("The defen-
dant's own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted
against him.").
247. See Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L.
REv 387, 389 (1996) (arguing that Miranda leads to fewer confessions and, therefore, harms the
efforts of law enforcement).
248. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 454, 559 (1994) (holding that suspect's state-
ment, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," did not trigger his Miranda right to counsel because any
such invocation must be sufficiently clear "that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances
would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney"); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S.
369, 373 (1979) (holding that waiver was valid even though suspect refused to sign a waiver because
"in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person
interrogated").
249. See United States v. Gell-Iren, 146 F.3d 827, 830 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Bauti-
sta, 145 F.3d 1140, 1146-50 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 225 (1998).
250. See Gell-Iren, 146 F.3d at 830; see also discussion supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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waive his rights unless custodial interrogation exists."' Finally, for a
waiver to be valid, the prosecution must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that it was made voluntarily and knowingly. "2
The Tenth Circuit's holdings in the previous cases are consistent
with its previous decisions. 3 These decisions do not represent new law,
but are examples of the court applying old law to new fact situations. The
court is attuned to the uneasiness created when a defendant's confession
or incriminating statement is not admitted due to a "technicality."'
Given societal attitudes towards criminals, the court's unwillingness to
exclude confessions or incriminating statements in these situations is not
surprising."5
III. THE SIxTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Background
The Sixth Amendment' has long been interpreted to provide counsel
to defendants for criminal proceedings in the federal courts. "7 In Gideon
v. Wainright," the Supreme Court held that the right to counsel is fun-
251. In other words, the suspect that confesses during a consensual meeting with police will not
be successful in arguing that he never waived his rights. See, e.g., Bautista, 145 F.3d at 1148-49; see
also discussion supra note 177.
252. See Gell-iren, 146 F.3d at 830. But see Leo, supra note 116, at 659-60 (stating that "the
Miranda waiver is not always automatically obtained but often becomes an act of consent negotiated
as police detectives employ subtle psychological strategies to predispose a suspect toward voluntar-
ily waiving his or her Miranda warnings").
253. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1503 (1996) (holding that an inter-
preter's failure to translate "waive" did not invalidate the defendant's waiver); United States v.
March, 999 F.2d 456,460 (1993) (holding that waiver was valid where police read and explained the
waiver form to an illiterate defendant); United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 866 (1986) (holding
that waiver was valid when a mentally alert defendant had been given Novocain for pain caused by a
gunshot wound to the mouth).
254. See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 12, at 1057-58 (citing a number of negative reactions to
the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda); Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1525 n.183 (1996) (discussing the
extreme negative public reaction for letting "bad guys" escape punishment due to a "technicality").
255. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991) ("Admissions of guilt resulting from
valid Miranda waivers are more than merely desirable; they are essential to society's compelling
interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law." (internal quotation marks
omitted)). See generally Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice, Psychology, and the Law: Proto-
types That Are Common, Senseful, and Not, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 461, 461-64 (1997)
(supporting "commonsense justice" by disaggregating and examining prototypes held within differ-
ent segments of society); Kelly D. Hine, Vigilantism Revisited: An Economic Analysis of the Law of
Extra-Judicial Self-Help or Why Can't Dick Shoot Henry for Stealing Jane's Truck?, 47 AM. U. L.
REv. 1221, 1228-37 (1998) (discussing the public and private costs of crime and how rising crime
leads to vigilantism).
. 256. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
257. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) ("The Sixth Amendment withholds
from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his
life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel." (footnote omitted)).
258. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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damental, applying to the states through operation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Therefore, the government must
provide counsel for indigent defendants in all felony prosecutions.' Ad-
ditionally, absent waiver, an indigent defendant may only be sentenced to
jail time in misdemeanor or petty offense cases if counsel represented
him at trial."'
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies automatically once a
person is indicted and requires the presence of counsel during any en-
counter where the government attempts to elicit information from the
defendant.' There can be no deliberate attempt to gather incriminating
information from a defendant without counsel unless the defendant
waives the right.' In comparison, the right to counsel established in
Miranda derives its authority from the Fifth Amendment.2 ' However, the
Miranda right is not a constitutional requirement, but rather a procedural
safeguard designed to protect a suspect's rights.' Moreover, the suspect
must invoke it.'
Courts analyze Sixth Amendment waivers under similar standards
to those used to assess Miranda waivers. 7 An individual must waive her
rights "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently."' Similar to the Ed-
wards rule,' if police initiate interrogation after a defendant invokes his
259. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CO ST. amend. XIV, § 1.
260. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342.
261. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
262. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,205-06 (1964).
263. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
264. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 469 (1966) ("Prior to any questioning, the
person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed.").
265. See id. (stating that the warnings are "procedural safeguards" to be used "unless other fully
effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a con-
tinuous opportunity to exercise it"); cf Daniel C. Nester, Distinguishing Fifth and Sixth Amendment
Rights to Counsel During Police Questioning, 16 S. ILL. U. LJ. 101, 103 (1991).
266. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994) (holding that the right to counsel in
not triggered until the suspect "unambiguously" invokes the right); Towne v. Dugger, 899 F.2d
1104, 1107 (11 th Cir. 1990) ("rhe threshold inquiry with regard to the waiver of the right to counsel
is whether the right to counsel was in fact invoked."); cf Marcy Strauss, Reinterrogation 22
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359, 365 (1995) (stating that "Miranda required that after a suspect invokes
her rights, the questions must cease").
267. Cf Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-93 (1988) (holding that where a Miranda
warning was sufficient to permit waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, it was also suffi-
cient to permit waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the same time).
268. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,403 (1977).
269. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) ("[A]n accused . having expressed
his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the
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Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the waiver is invalid, and any in-
criminating statements obtained after a waiver are inadmissible. '
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is both narrower and broader
than the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment."' The Sixth
Amendment's coverage is broader because it applies to any "critical
stage""27 of the judicial process, rather than only to custodial interroga-
tion.' However, it is narrower because the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel applies to interrogation for any suspected crime, whether or not
the adversarial relationship for that crime has been initiated.'
B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Strachan v. Army Clemency & Parole Board"'
a. Facts
Appellant Strachan had served two years of a six-year sentence for
attempted kidnapping when he was paroled in 1992.27 Four years later he
was convicted of assault, for which he served ninety days in the city
jail." Based on his assault conviction and other parole violations, the
authorities revoked Strachan's parole, returned him to prison." Addi-
tionally, the credit 79 Strachan received towards his six-year sentence was
revoked." Strachan argued that his assault conviction was void under the
Sixth Amendment because he did not have counsel for his defense.2'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit stated that Strachan had a right to counsel under
Gideon' and that absent an indication of counsel or an effective waiver,
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."); cf Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638,
641 (1984) (articulating the Edwards rule as "once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, any
subsequent conversation must be initiated by him").
270. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 628,636 (1986).
271. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171,178 (1991).
272. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (plurality opinion) (stating that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel can be triggered "by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, in-
dictment, information, or arraignment").
273. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 220 (1967); see also McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178.
274. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178; discussion infra note 306 and accompanying text.
275. 151 F.3d 1308 (10thCir. 1998).
276. See Strachan, 151 F.3d at 1310-11.
277. Seeid. atl311.
278. See id.
279. The credit for parole is commonly known as "street time." Id. at 1310.
280. See id. at 1311.
281. See id. The defendant also claimed that the district court erred in allowing his unconstitu-
tional conviction to be a basis for the revocation of his street time. See id.
282. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
applies to the states as well as the federal govemment).
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there exists a presumption that the right to counsel was denied." Where
an entitled defendant is denied counsel, any conviction is presumptively
void.'
The court indicated that the certified record of Strachan's conviction
contained blanks where either defense counsel was supposed to sign or
where the judge was supposed to indicate waiver of counsel."s The court
stated that an inconclusive record is equivalent to a silent one and, there-
fore, found that Strachan was not represented by counsel.2 The appellate
court vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for pro-
ceedings consistent with the appellate decision.'
2. United States v. Lin Lyn Trading, Ltd.28'
a. Facts
Appellee Thomas and his wife owned co-appellee Lin Lyn Trading,
an import company targeted by Customs agents." As a result of an in-
formant's tip, on February 22, 1991, agents searched Lin Lyn's offices
and seized many documents.' Five weeks later, Customs inspectors at
the Portland International Airport detained Thomas as he returned from a
trip to Asia."' The inspectors conferred via telephone with Customs
agents in the Portland office about the investigation and proceeded to
inspect documents he was carrying.' Included in these documents was a
yellow legal pad which Customs officials subsequently seized, despite
Thomas's claim that the pad contained notes of his conversations with
his attorney.'
The defendants requested the notepad's return, but an Assistant
United States Attorney ordered the material sealed.' The investigation
continued, and in 1993 appellees were notified that they could make a
motion for return of the notepad pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41(e). ' On September 7, 1994, the district court granted the
283. See Strachan, 151 F.3dat 1311.
284. See id.
285. See id
286. See id. (citing Oswald v. Crouse, 420 F.2d 373, 374 (10th Cir. 1969)).
287. See i- at 1310.
288. United States v. Lin Lyn Trading, Ltd., 149 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1998).






295. See id. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) states:
Motion for Return of Property. A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure or
by the deprivation of property may move the district court for the district in which the
property was seized for the return of the property on the ground that such person is enti-
tled to lawful possession of the property. The court shall receive evidence on any issue of
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motion finding that "its seizure was unlawful and the government's con-
tinued possession of privileged attorney-client communications would
cause the defendants irreparable injury."
The defendants were indicted for conspiracy to defraud the United
States, smuggling goods, and unlawful entry of goods.' Less than one
week after the indictment, the government returned the notepad.' The
district court dismissed the indictment based, in part, on the magistrate's
finding that the "government's deliberate intrusion into the attorney-
client relationship" violated the defendants' Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights.'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the decision to dismiss the indictment
for "abuse of discretion."'  The appellate court noted the lower court's
determination that the notepad's seizure "violated the Fourth Amend-
ment and that, because of the use of tainted evidence, the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel was violated immediately upon return of the in-
dictment."'  However, the Tenth Circuit, citing Maine v. Moulton,'
ruled that there was no Sixth Amendment violation and that the district
court erred in dismissing the indictment. 3
In reversing the dismissal of the indictment, the Tenth Circuit noted
that the Customs officials seized the notepad in 1991, but the government
did not issue an indictment until 1994.' Therefore, the defendant's right
to counsel was not violated' because the right to counsel attaches "at or
after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings."'
fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted, the property shall be
returned to the movant, although reasonable conditions may be imposed to protect access
and use of the property in subsequent proceedings. If a motion for return of property is
made or comes on for hearing in the district of trial after an indictment or information is
filed, it shall be treated also as a motion to suppress under Rule 12.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(e).
296. Lin Lyn, 149 F.3d at 1114.
297. See id.
298. See id.
299. Id. at 1115. The district court held that the actions of the government agents violated the
defendants' Fifth Amendment right to due process and a fair trial, and therefore, it dismissed the
indictment. See id. at 1117-18. The Tenth Circuit reversed because "the district court's failure to
consider alternative adequate remedies was an abuse of its discretion." Id. at 1118.
300. Id. at 1116.
301. Id.at1117.
302. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 & n.16 (1985) (stating that information obtained in
violation of the Sixth Amendment was not admissible in a case where an indictment had not been
handed down, but information was admissible if the Sixth Amendment right had not yet attached).
303. See in Lyn, 149 F.3dat 1117.
304. Seeid.at1118.
305. Seeid.at1117.
306. Id. The court cited Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (plurality opinion), for its dictum
that
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C. Other Circuits
In United States v. McLaughlin,' the defendant was on trial for his
role in the shooting of a government informant.' After prosecutors
cross-examined McLaughlin, the court took a fifteen-minute recess.3
The court told the defense counsel that she could redirect after the recess
and, at the prosecutor's request, ordered the attorney not to speak to
McLaughlin during the break about anything he had said during that
day's testimony."' After the recess, defense counsel stated that she had
no redirect, adding:
I did think to myself what other areas I might want to explore with
[the defendant]. I have identified other areas, and I would be prepared
to consult with him on that. But given the Court's ruling, I am not
permitted to do that, so I have no further questions.
McLaughlin was convicted on multiple counts and, on appeal, ar-
gued that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when the
court ordered his attorney not to talk to him during the fifteen minute
recess between his cross-examination and redirect.3'2 The D.C. Circuit
discussed similar cases involving recesses of varying lengths '3 and held
that preventing McLaughlin from talking to his attorney during the brief
recess was not a Sixth Amendment violation."' The court stated that the
trial judge has the sole discretion to order a recess during the testimony
[tihe initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is the
starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that
the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse posi-
tions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds him-
self faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intrica-
cies of substantive and procedural criminal law. It is this point, therefore, that marks the
commencement of the 'criminal prosecutions' to which alone the explicit guarantees of
the Sixth Amendment are applicable.
Id. at 689-90. On the other hand, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), stated:
The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the
privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police inter-
rogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way. It is at this point that our adversary system of criminal proceedings
commences, distinguishing itself at the outset from the inquisitorial system recognized in
some countries.
Id. at 477.
307. 164 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 1998).




312. See id. at 1.
313. Compare Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 283-85 (1989) (holding no Sixth Amendment
violation where discussion was barred during a fifteen minute recess between the defendant's direct
and cross), with Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (stating that preventing communi-
cation over a seventeen hour recess was a Sixth Amendment violation), and Mudd v. United States,
798 F.2d 1509, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating that preventing communication over the weekend was
a Sixth Amendment violation).
314. See McLaughlin, 164 F.3d at 4-5.
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of a witness."' Addressing McLaughlin's argument that the existence of
the recess allowed him to consult with his attorney about his testimony,
the court-stated: "We cannot hold that Sixth Amendment rights turn on
such happenstance. It cannot be the law that the right to counsel attaches
on the fortuity of a recess before defendant's redirect when there is no
right to such a recess. '
In United States v. Walker,3M7 appellant Quinn was involved in a car
chase with police?'8 After Quinn crashed his car and escaped on foot, the
police impounded the car and found a loaded 9mm semiautomatic hand-
gun."9 An investigation led to Quinn's arrest for possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon." At trial, an acquaintance of Quinn's, Lamond
Walker, testified that he, not Quinn, had been driving the car. 2' Police
suspected that Quinn suborned perjury from Walker and enlisted Quinn's
cellmate for assistance." Quinn made incriminating statements to the
cellmate, leading to an against Walker for perjury and against Quinn for
subornation of perjury." Quinn claimed these statements violated his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.3 ' The court noted that Quinn was not
indicted for subornation of perjury until nearly eight months after his
statements to his cellmate .3 ' Because the right to counsel does not attach
until the initiation of an adversarial process, the court rejected Quinn's
argument."
In Rogala v. District of Columbia,3 27 a police officer stopped an
automobile operated by Rogala and conducted a field sobriety test.
3
1
During the administration of the test, the police officer prevented Rogala
315. See id. at 5. The court noted that when a defendant acts as a witness the rules that apply to
other witnesses generally apply to him as well. See id.
316. Id.
317. 148 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 1998).
318. See Walker, 148 F.3d at 520.
319. See id.
320. See id.
321. See id. The jury deadlocked in the first trial. See id. On re-trial, Quinn was convicted,
although Walker again testified that he had been driving the car during the chase. See id. at 520-21.
322. See id. at 521. The cellmate was asked to be "attuned" to anything Quinn might say about
his trial, but "not to initiate any conversation" with him. Id.
323. See id. Quinn told his cellmate "he should not be in jail because his 'home boy' had 'stood
up in court and took the rap for him being in the car."' Id. The cellmate then asked Quinn if he was
driving the car during the chase, to which Quinn replied that he was, but that "his 'home boy' had
claimed to be the driver." Id.
324. See id. In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), the Court held that the defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated "when there was used against him at his trial
evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him
after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel." Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
325. See Walker, 148 F.3d at 529.
326. See id. at 528-29 (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) (plurality opin-
ion)); see also discussion supra note 306.
327. 161 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
328. See Rogala, 161 F.3dat45.
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from interacting with his passenger, an attorney. 9 Rogala claimed the
officer violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by preventing any
consultation with the attorney.3" The D.C. Circuit ruled against the de-
fendant because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not begin
until adversary judicial proceedings begin."'
D. Analysis
The cases decided by the Tenth Circuit during the survey period are
consistent with prior holdings."2 Issues involving the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel are far removed from the controversy and debate sur-
rounding Miranda because the Sixth Amendment is perceived as pro-
tecting liberty and fairness, while Miranda is perceived as impeding the
police.333 While there is some debate concerning whether the Supreme
Court and other judicial bodies have remained true to the Framers' origi-
nal intent for the Sixth Amendment," there are no indications that the
Court will apply a more narrow reading.'"
A reoccurring issue within all of the circuits involves the triggering
point for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. As stated in Kirby v. Illi-
nois,'" an accused has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at any "critical
stage" of the prosecution.37 Although the Supreme Court has indicated
when the Sixth Amendment requires the appointment of counsel, the Court
329. See id. at 48.
330. See id. at 55.
331. See id. The court pointed out that the defendant's "fortuity" to be stopped while riding
with an attorney did not grant additional Sixth Amendment protection. Id.
332. See, e.g., Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347, 1351 (10th Cir. 1994) ("The Sixth Amendment
right to counsel does not attach until the initiation of formal adversary criminal proceedings 'whether
by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.' (quoting
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) (plurality opinion))); Oswald v. Crouse, 420 F.2d
373, 374 (10th Cir. 1969) (holding that the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to de-
termine the validity of his conviction where the trial record was ambiguous as to whether he was
represented by an attorney).
333. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (stating that the Sixth Amendment is
"deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty"); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 69 (1932) ("Left without the aid of counsel [the defendant] may be put on trial without a
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his de-
fense ...."); see also supra notes 12, 119-20 and accompanying text.
334. See Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered
Right?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 35, 43 (1991) (stating that the Sixth Amendment "contemplated the
defendant's right to choose private counsel; it did not envision the provision of appointed counsel").
335. But see Ralph Ruebner, Police Interrogation: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
the Right to Counsel, and the Incomplete Metamorphosis of Justice White, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv,511,
539 (1994) (arguing that Justice White's decisions narrowed the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
336. 406 U.S. 682,690(1972).
337. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690; accord United States v. Gordon, 4 F3d 1567, 1571 (10th Cir.
1993); United States v. Geittmann, 733 F.2d 1419, 1425 (10th Cir. 1984); Nees v. Bishop, 730 F.2d
606, 611 (10th Cir. 1984); cf. supra notes 272, 306.
1999] CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
has not set specific guidelines for performance, other than saying "that the
right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel. 338
CONCLUSION
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit continued to narrowly
apply the Miranda doctrine. The Supreme Court has also refused to ex-
pand Miranda and may take the opportunity to further limit it in the fu-
ture.
39
The cases heard by the Tenth Circuit focused on the existence of
custodial interrogation and the validity of the Miranda waiver. In all
cases, the court rejected the defendants' claims. This reflects the difficult
burden for defendants in successfully winning Miranda issues before the
court.
The Tenth Circuit also followed its own precedent in issues involv-
ing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Here, the court found viola-
tions of a defendant's rights when it was unclear whether the defendant
had representation. The court also followed the Supreme Court in refus-
ing to grant a Sixth Amendment right to counsel prior to the formal ini-
tiation of adversarial proceedings.
Kevin B. Davis*
338. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
339. See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed,
(U.S. Jul. 30, 1999) (No. 97-159-A). In Dickerson, the defendant argued that his voluntary confes-
sion should have been suppressed due to a technical violation of Miranda. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d
at 671. The Fourth Circuit reversed because the lower court did not consider 18 U.S.C. § 3501
(1994). See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 671. Section 3501, enacted two years after Miranda, states that a
voluntary confession "shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear
relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the
confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances." 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a). Although
neither party addressed the statute, the Fourth Circuit held that "Congress, pursuant to its power to
establish the rules of evidence and procedure in the federal courts, acted well within its authority in
enacting § 3501. As a consequence, § 3501, rather than Miranda, governs the admissibility of con-
fessions in federal court." Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 671-72. See generally Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda
Dead, Was It Overruled, Or Is It Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THOMAs L. REV. 461, 479-81 (1998) (discuss-
ing the impact of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 on the Miranda decision).
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